lunes, 26 de noviembre de 2007

Summers pesimista

Larry Summers argumenta en el FT que lo peor está por venir:

"Three months ago it was reasonable to expect that the subprime credit crisis would be a financially significant event but not one that would threaten the overall pattern of economic growth. This is still a possible outcome but no longer the preponderant probability.

Even if necessary changes in policy are implemented, the odds now favour a US recession that slows growth significantly on a global basis. Without stronger policy responses than have been observed to date, moreover, there is the risk that the adverse impacts will be felt for the rest of this decade and beyond."
Esencialmente el argumento dice que los precios de las propiedades van a seguir cayendo y que las tasas de ejecuciones hipotecarias se van a duplicar el año que viene. Su propuesta de política es:

"First, maintaining demand must be the over-arching macro-economic priority. That means the Fed has to get ahead of the curve and recognise - as the market already has - that levels of the Fed Funds rate that were neutral when the financial system was working normally are quite contractionary today. As important as long-run deficit reduction is, fiscal policy needs to be on stand-by to provide immediate temporary stimulus through spending or tax benefits for low- and middle-income families if the situation worsens.

Second, policymakers need to articulate a clear strategy addressing the various pressures leading to contractions in credit. Very likely this will involve measures that are non-traditional, given how much of the problem lies outside bank balance sheets. The time for worrying about imprudent lending is past. The priority now has to be maintaining the flow of credit. The current main policy thrust - the so-called "super conduit", in which banks co-operate to take on the assets of troubled investment vehicles - has never been publicly explained in any detail by the US Treasury. On the information available, the "super conduit" has worrying similarities with Japanese banking practices of the 1990s that aroused criticism from American authorities for their lack of transparency, suppression of genuine market pricing of bad credits, and inhibiting effect on new lending. Perhaps there is a strong case for it, but that case has yet to be made.

Third, there needs to be a comprehensive approach taken to maintaining demand in the housing market to the maximum extent possible. The government operating through the Federal Housing Administration, through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, or through some kind of direct lending, needs to assure that there is a continuing flow of reasonably priced loans to credit worthy home purchasers. At the same time there need to be templates established for the restructuring of mortgages to homeowners who cannot afford their resets, so every case does not have to be managed individually."
Por ahí no alcanza - advierte Summers - pero es mucho más que lo que se está haciendo hasta ahora.

2 comentarios:

  1. Es dificil pensar diferente a la FED y creer q uno tiene razon.
    Por cantidad de informacion y profesionales pensando, q elaboran las politicas q luego llevan adelante, es mas probable q acierten mas q uno.
    Sin embargo, creo q el diagnostico de base podria no ser el adecuado.
    Mi punto es q la crisis no se basa en niveles de tasas q generan-fomentan niveles de ahorro mayores al necesario, sino un terrible temor crediticio basado en la posibilidad de no recupero de prestamos.
    Ete aqui, q la politica de inyectar liquidez via baja de tasas es erronea, ya q solamente fomenta una mayor salida de capitales, q no encuentran "tasa" suficiente para navegar la crisis. El abrupto cambio de pendiente de la curva + el aumento del spread treasuries-highyield dan prueba de esto.
    El riesgo recesivo, a mi entender, es puramente de confianza, si algo sobra en el Mundo hoy es liquidez. Bajar las tasas para inyectar "mas" liquidez solo lograra una fuga mayor hacia otras monedas, mas un desequilibrio entre masa monetaria y bs reales, q se traduce en inflacion.
    Mi opinion es q Ben deberia subir nuevamente la tasa a 5%, como senal inequivoca del nuevo rumbo, conjuntamente con un anuncio de recompra via Fannie o algun otro vehiculo de las carteras en problemas, "valuadas a mercado".
    Con esto cortaria con la sangria del dolar, equilibraria el nivel de confianza, evitaria la inflacion q lo espera a la vuelta de la esquina, y podria evitar una recesion q es fogoneada x un nivel de desconfianza tal, q supera el volumen abismal de papelitos verdes dando vuelta x el Mundo
    Kaloma

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  2. Ben ya da por descontada una recesion, lo que esta haciendo es guiar para que sea una recesion y no una depresion.

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